Settling for less? Tobacco industry. by Dahl, R C
SDheres of Infuence
I
In July 1997, five major U.S. tobacco
companies settled with Mississippi, the
first state to file suit to recover damages
for smoking-related Medicaid expendi-
tures. It was the first time the industry had
paid damages for injuries claimed by a
plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, the companies
settled with three other state plaintiffs-
Florida, Texas, and Minnesota and the
stage was set for last November's settle-
ment with the 46 remaining states, an
agreement by which the cigarette makers
would pay out the biggest financial settle-
ment in history: $206 billion over the next
25 years. The tobacco industry's invulnera-
bility to civil lawsuits for health-related
damages had come to an end.
Plaintiffs had long faced a virtually
insurmountable obstacle in taking personal
injury claims to court: time after time,
juries had agreed with the cigarette makers
that smokers knowingly assume the risks
associated with using tobacco products.
The spectacular turnabout that came with
the state litigation with Minnesota, Texas,
Florida, and Mississippi wasn't prompted
so much by the strength oftheir cases as by
a shift in legal tactics. Where individual
plaintiffs claimed that tobacco companies
were negligent in selling them a dangerous
product, the state lawsuits ignored that
argument altogether and claimed that the
tobacco industry rightfully owes the states






plaintiffs shifted the argument from tradi-
tional personal injury tort law to more ofa
public health theory based on epidemio-
logical studies of how tobacco harms pop-
ulations as well as individuals. As Peter D.
Jacobson, an associate professor of health
management and policy at the University
of Michigan School of Public Health,
points out in an article he coauthored with
professor Kenneth E. Warren, "Since the
state has no choice but to absorb the
Medicaid costs of tobacco-related diseases,
and it is the taxpayers, not smokers, who
are injured financially, the states argue that
the traditional industry defenses raised in
individual litigation are irrelevant."
Jacobson's article is scheduled for publica-
tion in the June issue of the Journal of
Health Polities, Policy andLaw.
The multistate deal reached last
November failed to achieve the conices-
sions that many public health advo-
cates sought. Many of these advo-
cates have been vocal in their criti-
cism of the final settlement,
which they say has let the
tobacco companies off the
hook in several ways. This
is especiallx bard to swal-
low, they contenid, because nlot
so long ago, in June 1997. a deal
that would have beenl tougher on Big
Tobacco and more lucrative for the states
was seemingly in hand. The deal would
have provided the states $368.5 billion and
the tobacco industry would have agreed to
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
urisdiction, restrictions on secondhand
smoke, comprehensive marketing restric-
tions, and other tough measures. But
tobacco-control advocates balked at the
cigarette makers' insistence oni future
immunity from litigation, and the deal
went by the board.
A subsequent effort by Senator John
McCain (R-Arizona) to exact similar com-
pensation from cigarette makers died on
Capitol Hill. Last spring, McCain spon-
sored a bill that demanded $368.5 billion in
compensation from the industry; in negoti-
ations, the amount rose to $516 billion.
The powerful tobacco lobby went into high
gear, and in the end, the entire bill failed. As
time went on, Jacobson says, the tobacco
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industry seemed to regain its balance. "By
the time you got to the McCain legislation,
the price tag was so high that it wasn't
worth it to the tobacco industry, so they
walked away," Jacobson says. "Then they
put on a brilliant public relations campaign
over taxes, over government intrusion into
individual responsibility. It was a master-
piece. I don't like the result, but you've got
to say, 'Here's an industry thatfaced disaster
and turned it around."'
Lacking Public Health
Critics have pointed out that not only is the
per-capita dollar amount in the multistate
settlement lower than in the four individual
settlements and the failed settlement pro-
posal of 1997, but the public health provi-
sions are weaker as well. Among the conces-
sions that the tobacco industry demanded
from the state plaintiffs was the elimination
ofany mention ofFDA controls. This time
there was no mention, as there was in the
proposed 1997 deal, of penalties against
tobacco companies if smoking rates don't
drop, and no agreements to ban cigarette
vending machines. In addition, critics point
to one part ofthe agreement as potentially
pitting the states against the federal govern-
ment. Article 10 of the deal gives tobacco
companies a dollar-for-dollar offset against
federal dollars that come from raised tobac-
co taxes or other fees that are paid to the
states. Critics say this stipulation could
undermine efforts to pass comprehensive
national tobacco control legislation.
In addition to the money that they'll
be paying to the states, the tobacco indus-
try also agreed to provide $25 million
annually for the next 10 years in support of
a newly created charitable foundation that
will study programs aimed at reducing
teenage smoking and preventing tobacco-
related diseases. The companies also agreed
to provide $1.45 billion over the next five
years to support a national advertising and
educational program to counter youth
tobacco use and educate consumers about
tobacco-related diseases.
In agreeing to the settlement, the com-
panies also agreed to a variety ofrestrictions
on marketing and advertising tobacco prod-
ucts. These include prohibiting all outdoor
and transit advertising, brand-name spon-
sorship of team sports or youth-oriented
events, use oftobacco brand names for sta-
diums and arenas, use ofcartoon characters
(but not human subjects, such as the
Marlboro Man) to advertise tobacco prod-
ucts, payments for placement of tobacco
products in movies and television shows,
and sale or distribution ofnontobacco mer-
chandise with brand-name logos. Theagree-
ment also requires a commitment, starting
on 22 May 1999, to develop a "corporate
commitment" to reduceyouth tobacco use.
The recent multistate settlement "was
pretty much a clean sweep for the tobacco
people," says Stanton Glantz, a professor of
medicine at the University ofCalifornia at
San Francisco and a long-time antismok-
ing advocate. Says Glantz, "The amount of
money in [the settlement] is about 30
cents on the dollar compared with what
smoking actually cost the states in
Medicaid expenses, and the public health
provisions in it are a joke. Other than that,
it's fine."
Glantz describes the deal's public
health provisions as "a collection of loop-
holes that the tobacco companies have
used to get around regulation in other
countries where there are strong tobacco
control regulations." For example, he says,
"[The companies are] not allowed to have
billboards, but they are allowed to have
tobacco-sponsored events, and they're
allowed to have billboards promoting the
tobacco-sponsored events."
Glantz also criticizes the nature of the
"public antismoking foundation" that the
tobacco companies agreed to set up as part
ofthe settlement, because its focus on pre-
venting only youth from smoking may
actually backfire. "When you have ayouth-
only program, it isn't effective because kids
smoke to look grown-up," he says. "Ifthe
whole message is 'we don't want kids to
smoke,' it reinforces the industry's 'smok-
ing is a way for kids to look grown-up'
message.
To Jacobson, this failure to provide the
measures that were desired by public
health advocates could have been averted
in 1997 when the tobacco industry had
offered to capitulate to FDA control in
exchange for immunity from litigation.
"Not that I like giving immunity from liti-
gation at all, but here's where I depart
from the tobacco control movement,"
Jacobson says. "From my perspective, the
problem was that the tobacco control com-
munity felt that they didn't have to com-
promise because they could obtain every
objective they sought through litigation.
And that, I think, is a flawed premise."
When the tobacco lawyers sat down for
the final time with the attorneys general
last November, the industry had the upper
hand. In exchange for the money, the
industry insisted on a variety of stipula-
tions and told the litigants to take it or
leave it, giving them four days to decide. In
the end, the attorneys general gave in.
"My sense," Jacobson says, "is that the
[attorneys general] looked around and said,
'If we hold out, what can we expect to
achieve? We'll have years oflitigation, and
the litigation is going to be based primarily
on damage actions rather than the public
health goals originally sought. We've lost
momentum. Congress backed away from a
stronger settlement. Where are we going
with this?' I think they basically said, 'Let's
takewhat we can and get out ofhere."'
While public health advocates are level-
ing criticism, however, the attorneys general
who negotiated the settlement defend it as a
good deal-but clearly not as a panacea.
After announcing the settlement on 16
November 1998, the eight state attorneys
general who negotiated the deal issued a
joint statement that said, in part, "[Tlhis is
litigation, not legislation. Congress should
pass legislation to provide essential
reforms-including full Food and Drug
Administration authority over tobacco-and
wepledge tohelp."
BigTobacco, Big Money
As newly elected U.S. state legislatures
convened in January, one of the tasks fac-
ing each seemed the pleasantest of prob-
lems-how best to divide up the huge
monetary spoils that have come their way
from Big Tobacco. For most states, their
share of the loot is the largest legal settle-
ment they've ever achieved. And not sur-
prisingly, since the payouts have not yet
been earmarked by the states for any spe-
cific purposes, a wide variety ofgroups and
interests are lobbying for a piece ofit.
Some contend that the money should
simplybe returned to the taxpayers. Others
favor more specific uses for the money. In
late 1998, the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL) polled all 50
states to identify how legislators were
thinking ofspending the money. That poll
revealed that, for instance, some New
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Jersey lawmakers wanted to use some of
the money for school construction. It also
showed support in South Carolina for a
plan to use some of the funds for capital
projects, and in Louisiana, Governor Mike
Foster said that he wanted to sell future
tobacco payments now in order to pay off
state debt and raise teacher salaries.
Meanwhile, the Department ofHealth
and Human Services is claiming that it
deserves at least halfofthe money because
existing Medicaid laws compel the depart-
ment to recover its share (based on its
matching percentage) of third-party pay-
ments collected by states on behalf of
Medicaid clients. The department is claim-
ing that the tobacco settlement funds are
third-party recoveries as defined by the
Medicaid statute. According to the NCSL,
an amendment to the Medicaid statute to
exempt state tobacco settlement funds
from federal recoupment must be enacted
to prevent seizure of those funds when
they first become available in 2000.
Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas)
and Bob Graham (D-Florida) areleading a
bipartisan group proposing legislation to
bar the federal government from taking
any of the money, while Congressman
Michael Bilirakis (R-Florida) has intro-
duced a similar measure in the House. 'It's
anybody's guess what will happen," says
Peter Fisher, manager ofstate issues for the
Washington, DC-based public interest
group Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.
"It's certainlygoing to be atoughfight."
While the NCSL reports that most leg-
islative discussions have centered around
using the money for health care-related
services, the extent to which the settlement
ultimately will improve the health of the
country's citizens and the quality ofthe air
theybreathe is unknown.
StatesAre Making Plans
As the NCSL discovered in its survey, most
states say they are planning to use their
windfall for health-related services, but the
extent of these services from state to state
won't be known until the current legisla-
tive session plays out and everyone who
thinks their interest deserves a piece ofthe
action has their say. According to NCSL
researcher Melissa Hough, at least six states
created trust funds in the last session in
anticipation of the settlement funds, but
plans are still definitely in the preliminary
stages. Some of the plans being discussed
by states at the end ofJanuary, according
to the NCSL, induded the following:
* In Indiana, one bill that had been
introduced would earmark 20% of the
tobacco settlement funds for grants to
tobacco growers who incur losses due to
the settlement, and 10% to Purdue
University to develop new farm
commodities to replace tobacco.
* In Connecticut, one proposed bill would
create a tobacco settlement disbursement
advisory committee that would advise
the governor on the use ofthe money. It
also would require that 45% of the
money be used for prevention, educa-
tion, and cessation programs, 45% for
health services not provided by existing
programs, and 10% for an endowment
fund.
* In Arizona, Governor Jane Dee Hull
suggested spending the money on a pro-
gram for the state's mental hospitals and
creating a state health trust fund to
ensure a permanent funding stream for
health care programs.
* In Montana, a preliminary proposal by
Governor Marc Racicot would earmark
35% of the money for smoking preven-
tion and control, 35% for a trust fund
for future health and long-term care
needs, and 30% for the general fund.
The failure of tobacco control and
public health advocates to achieve the fea-
tures theywanted in the settlement means
that their days of legislative lobbying are
far from over. "Our assessment ofthe set-
tlement is that it's a decent first step, but
it leaves a lot still to be done both at the
national level and at the state level," says
Fisher. "There's a lot not in it that we've
been advocating for a long time, like FDA
authority over tobacco. There's nothing
in it regarding environmental tobacco
smoke, there's nothing regarding penalties
on the tobacco industry if smoking rates
don't decline-all those things were in
the Senate bill last year. Things like that
still need to happen on the federal level."
He adds, "And ofcourse on the state level
whether this is a success or failure is really
dependent on how the money gets used.
That's our major focus at the moment.
It's trying to ensure that state legislatures
that will be appropriating all this money
spend significant portions ofit on putting
together tobacco prevention and educa-
tion programs."
The example of Minnesota shows that
this effort may be an uphill fight. In
Minnesota, where the state's individual
1997 settlement of$6.1 billion is twice the
per-capita rate that came out ofthe multi-
state settlement, only 3% of the amount,
or $200 million, has been allocated for
smoking prevention and cessation. "The
missing piece is preventing the next gener-
ation from smoking," says Jim Audette, a
spokesman for the Minnesota Smoke-Free
Coalition. "That missing piece would be
provided by a settlement recommendation
that 11% of the total, or about $650 mil-
lion, be put into an endowment to finance
smoking prevention campaigns, and the
coalition is working for the full allotment."
That move was strongly backed by Hubert
H. Humphrey III, the attorney general
who brought the tobacco suit. But when
Humphrey lost his bid for the Minnesota
governorship to Reform Party candidate
Jesse Ventura, antismoking groups there
lost an important ally. According to
Audette, Ventura has indicated that he
favors a mixed use of the funds, some for
antismoking purposes and some for other
uses. Currently, two task forces are study-
ing how to distribute the money. Audette
says that polls in Minnesota have shown
that 88% of the public wants half of the
settlement to go for tobacco-related health
uses. "We feel we have a 50-50 shot," he
says. "But we know we're going to have to
fight some basic political realities."
Jacobson argues that public health
advocates should take a lesson from what
theyperceive to be the shortcomings ofthe
settlement. The lesson, he contends, is that
litigation is not the way to achieve strong
public policy, but rather one tool among
many. "As public health advocates, we
need to have a better sense of what's
achievable and what the best set ofmecha-
nisms would be for achieving those goals,"
he says. "No one approach is likely to be
either self-evident or effective. That is, you
can't simply say, 'Let the FDA regulate.'
You can't simply say, 'Let the courts han-
dle it.' As many have noted, we have to
think comprehensively. My concern is that
this rush to litigate as a panacea will have
the long-run effect of undermining that
shared sense ofa comprehensive solution."
Richard Charles Dahl
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